
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February 1, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE

UNITED NATIONS

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive on "Chemical

Weapons Arms Control Policy" (S)

The President has approved the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control as forwarded to the National Security Council on January 22, 1983, and as incorporated into the attached National Security Decision Directive, on "Chemical Weapons Arms Control Policy." (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment

**NSDD-79** 

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### THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 1, 1983

National Security Decision Directive Number 79

### U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL POLICY (C)

To enhance United States national security interests, and specifically, to promote our policy objectives in the area of chemical weapons arms control, the United States, following the February 1 opening of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament's (CD) 1983 session, will:

- (1) Table, in the CD, the interagency document entitled "U.S. Detailed Views on the Contents of a Chemical Weapons Ban," dated January 14, 1983; and
- (2) Support a change in the CD Chemical Weapons Working Group mandate to negotiation of a complete and verifiable chemical weapons ban. Focus will be on development of effective verification and compliance arrangements. (S)

With respect to the status of the paper entitled, "U.S. Detailed Views on the Content of a Chemical Weapons Ban," it is to be understood that:

- -- The paper is a framework for discussion, and is to serve as the basis for U.S. participation in CD negotiations on a chemical weapons arms control agreement;
- The paper is subject to modification and further refinement, as deemed appropriate to safeguard U.S. security and foreign policy interests; and thus
- -- The paper does not constitute a formal United States negotiating position on a proposal for the actual text of any eventual agreement in this area. (S)

With respect to United States policy on CD negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, it is to be understood that:

The United States will continue to focus efforts in the CD primarily on developing effective verification and compliance arrangements for a complete chemical weapons ban;

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- -- Verification and compliance arrangements, beyond those set forth in the paper, "U.S. Detailed Views on the Content of a Chemical Weapons Ban," should be formulated and negotiated in the CD to reduce risks from undetected evasion; and
- -- The United States will not support or participate in the drafting of actual treaty text until an effective verification and compliance framework, acceptable to the United States, has been negotiated. (S)

It is also to be understood, in this regard, that the United States' decision to support CD negotiations on a complete chemical weapons ban:

- -- Requires that the modernization of short- and long-range chemical weapons proceed on an urgent basis to enable the United States to gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control, and so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent/retaliatory capability until such time as a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons has been obtained;
- -- Will require that we continue to make the direct connection between Soviet and surrogate use of toxin and other chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and the need for effective verification and compliance measures in any future chemical weapons agreement; and
- -- Is made without prejudice to decisions the United States may make concerning initiation of CD negotiations in areas or on issues other than chemical weapons arms control. (S)

Rand Ragan

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